This Could Get Interesting...

Tribal engagement: the "3rd way" in Afghanistan?

First, more reading recommendations for anyone really trying to understand Afghanistan. You need to closely monitor the following websites/blogs:

• Small Wars Journal. An indispensable resource with professional articles, great commentary from practicing experts, and links galore. I browse it almost daily.
  
  
• Abu Muqawama. Quirky name but excellent content. Andrew Exum, former Army Ranger, Afghan war vet, and published scholar is an up-and-comer among Middle East and counterinsurgency analysts. Most recently, he was on General McChrystal‘s strategy review team.
  
  
• Freerange International. I’ve mentioned this before, but again, this is probably the best “boots-on-the-ground” reporting today. Retired Marine infantryman Tim Lynch runs a small private security company, and writes about working outside the wire.
  
  
• It’s the Tribes, Stupid. Steven Pressfield, noted author of “Gates of Fire” and another former Marine, recently started a blog on the importance of tribes in Afghanistan. He’s a touch melodramatic, but puts out great stuff.

For the last couple of weeks, each of these sites has highlighted a paper titled “One Tribe at a Time”, written by a young Army officer. Jim Gant is a major in the Army Special Forces, an Afghanistan and Iraq combat vet, and a warrior to the bone. Encouraged by Pressfield who published the paper on his site (download it here), Gant has put together what amounts to a “third way” for fighting the Taliban that is neither counter-terrorism, nor pure counter-insurgency.

Gant relates his experience of leading an “A-team” of nine as they moved into the remote village of Mangwel, in Konar province along the border with Pakistan in 2003. They lived, ate, slept and fought alongside the tribesmen of Mangwel, and forged mutual bonds of trust, respect and, yes, love. “Their families became our families”, he relates.

Essentially, he advocates allying with the existing age-old power structure. “The enemy thinks he can wait us out”, says Gant. “However, we can turn time into an ally if we partner with the tribes and demonstrate our commitment to them. Once they believe we share the same objectives and are not leaving, they will support us and fight alongside us.”


He then proposes a well-thought out plan for engaging tribes in Afghanistan and possibly Pakistan (particularly Pashtuns, but others also) in a coherent way. He makes specific recommendations for creating dedicated Tribal Engagement Teams, to fan out across the key terrain and “beat the Taliban at its own game”. Gant claims this strategy would require less troops than a robust counterinsurgency campaign.

Already his ideas are getting national-level play, as the press has started to get a whiff. As the Obama administration grapples with the decision on how many troops to commit, tribal engagement may well be seen as a fresh approach. One thing is sure, Maj Gant is ready to commit. He ends by basically calling out the decision-makers. “I will get on a helicopter tonight, armed with an AK-47 and 300 rounds of ammunition, and put my life on the line and my strategy to the test. Will you do the same?”


T.T.

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McChrystal's people power

I’m becoming a big McChrystal fan. No, that’s not a music group. I’m talking about General Stan McChrystal. When he took over in June as commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan , I wasn’t quite sure what signal was being sent. He is legendary in the close-hold world of special operations, after five years running Joint Special Ops Command (JSOC). McChrystal and his shadowy task forces were in charge of hunting down terrorists, methodically dismantling the covert networks of al-Qaida, Ansar al-Sunna, and Iranian-backed “special groups” in Iraq.

As king of the “snake-eaters”, his selection to lead the new Coalition efforts in Afghanistan raised big questions. Did this mean a turn away from counter-insurgency towards a hunter-killer or counter-terrorist strategy? Would he adopt more of a raiding approach, needing less troops overall? As I’ve written before, however, a raiding approach or off-shoring the war is a recipe for failure.

It’s now abundantly clear that he's much more than a snake-eater. He has the intellectual breadth and vision to think beyond the spec-ops world and direct action missions, and has embraced the tenets of counter-insurgency or COIN (what some dirisively call nation-building). His assessment of the war , and his recommendations on troops needed, are based on conducting a population-centric COIN. In August, he released "commander's guidance" for all U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. It's a great read and shows the thinking behind his campaign plan. Here are the highlights:

• Protecting the Afghan people is the mission... Earn the support of the people and the war is won, regardless of how many militants are killed or captured.
  
  
• Security may not come from overwhelming firepower… Familial and tribal connections turns "attrition math" on its head. The death of two [insurgents] creates more willing recruits: 10 minus 2 equals 20 rather than 8.
  
  
• We must think and act very differently. An effective "offensive" operation is one that takes from the insurgent what he cannot afford to lose, control of the population.
  
  
• Counterinsurgency is an argument to earn support of the people. Every action, reaction, failure to act, and all that is said and done become part of the debate.
  
  
• Focus 95% of our energy on the 95% of the population that needs support. Doing so will isolate the insurgents... Do not let them distract you.
  
  
• Embrace the People. Afghan culture is founded on personal relationships… Earning the trust of the people is a large part of our mission.
  
  
• Partner with Afghan Security Forces. Build their capacity to secure their own country. Foster ownership. Their success is our success.
  
  
• This is a battle of wits. Be vigilant as the environment shifts and the enemy adapts... Adapt faster than they are able to adjust.

See the whole document here.

The general's guidance gives a window into the current debates over strategy and troop levels. His request for more approximately 40,000 more troops was based on conducting a population-centric plan, and implementing these guidelines. That’s how he intends to win. Will the administration let him?

T.T.

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Knowing the human terrain saves lives

One of the important lessons the U.S. military has learned in Iraq and Afghanistan is how to think about, plan for, and relate with, the civilian population. This is an important and fundamental shift, because in any war, the first instinct of the military mind is figuring out how to bring lethal force to bear on the enemy. In plain English, that means shooting things and blowing stuff up.

Today, however, you’ll be hard pressed to find a commander at any level or a front-line soldier or Marine, who doesn’t know and appreciate the value of understanding the population and treating civilians with respect. In fact, a term-of-art in use for several years now is “human terrain”.

Considering human beings as terrain might sound insensitive to some, but the concept has been key to operating in a more careful, intelligent and therefore humane way. Geographic terrain, of course, has been a key factor in wars since time immemorial. But for much of military history, the people inhabiting that geography were mostly seen as irrelevant, a nuisance to be pushed aside, or even as targets. Adopting the idea of human terrain creates a whole new paradigm.

In almost any ground unit command post today in Afghanistan or Iraq, you’ll see map overlays, printouts and (of course) intricate PowerPoint presentations depicting the human makeup of the area of operations. Those will show tribal areas, ethnic makeup, demographic data, agricultural and employment stats, land ownership, local political divisions, and all sorts of related information.

You’ll also find a number of population-centric initiatives in place. These include teams of female personnel (Marines call them “lionesses”) to better relate to Islamic women, and programs to monitor what are called “atmospherics”, i.e. the general attitude and street-level perceptions in various neighborhoods and sectors. One of the more notable, and simultaneously controversial, programs is the Army’s Human Terrain System (HTS) which assigns mixed teams of civilian contractors and military personnel to brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) are composed of academics with an advanced degree in anthropology or sociology, along with officers and enlisted troops with a background in civil affairs, engineering, security and special forces. Their main function is to advise commanders and staff of the ethnic, religious, cultural and local economic factors that affect their area.

In the complex realm of counterinsurgency, a combat unit detailed understanding of local traditions, customs and underlying motivations, can often accomplish its objectives without resorting to combat. For example, appreciating the delicate tribal arrangements can preclude U.S. forces from inadvertently provoking violence by drilling a well or building a market that benefits one tribe over another. Knowing the human terrain saves lives, of both soldiers and civilians.

Unfortunately, a bitter debate has swirled around the fielding of HTTs. Back in the states, some professional anthropologists and other academics have vehemently opposed having their “pure” disciplines sullied in support of a war effort. Now there’s irony for you. Ivory tower academics opposing a program that uses their own field of study to preserve the human terrain.

The Associated Press dishonors itself

I'm sure most of you have heard about last month's despicable decision by the Associated Press (AP) to publish a photograph of a dying Marine, hit by enemy fire in Afghanistan. On 14 August, Lance Corporal Joshua Bernard was on patrol in Helmand province, when his squad was ambushed. AP photographer Julie Jacobsen was accompanying the unit.

As LCpl Bernard, 21, lay mortally wounded, surrounded by brother Marines trying to keep him alive, Jacobsen decided to focus in on the scene. She was some distance away, and took the photos with a telephoto lens. Her controversial photo shows Bernard, with blood-soaked legs, in obvious anguish. It is a hard image to see. It took me a couple weeks to decide to view it, as my own son will be pulling yet another combat tour as an Army Ranger... (deep breath)...

Without dwelling on this outrage, let me tie in some other thoughts about AP and media in general. Regular readers know I have little faith in mainstream reporting, particularly from Iraq or Afghanistan, where it seems most media outlets have abandoned the principle of impartiality, and have a vested interest in seeing things in the worst light and in seeing America humbled or defeated.

AP is the U.S.-based newswire service (one of the world's largest) forming a cornerstone of mainstream media. Stories put out by AP are published and republished by thousands of newspapers and other outlets. It's supposed to be a feeder for basic news, and you'll see AP's byline everywhere -- including throughout The Spectrum. However, if you read closely, and pay attention to what's covered and what's not, it's easy to see AP's dominant political bias.

One of the more interesting experiences I had in Iraq was an informal debate with the Editor at AP's Iraq Bureau. It was summer of 2007, during the surge. Iraqi tribes were turning our way and positive trends were plainly evident. And yet, as I noted to the Editor, AP's coverage was a constant drumbeat of doom, even as things were clearly turning around. “You're missing the boat” I told her, “You need to posture yourself for Coalition success”, but she was having none of it.

Bernie Goldberg, former CBS reporter turned media critic, proposes that the term “mainstream media” needs a replacement. For Goldberg, the pillars of old-line media hardly represent the mainstream. I think he's right. When higher-ups at AP choose to violate embed agreements, reject Defense Secretary Gate's public plea not to publish the photo, and refuse to honor the wishes of LCpl Bernard's parents to keep his dying agony private, they're clearly not mainstream.

Here's the rub. Why is anyone relying on AP wire stories for actual news anymore? Along with The Spectrum, most U.S. papers draw heavily from AP feeds. Discerning readers already note AP's byline and tune out, or look for something less slanted. More readers should do the same. But it's also time news editors start looking for real news, not AP's camouflaged “leftstream” source of biased coverage.

T.T.

See my other columns on Afghanistan

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Jigger wha?!?

Here's something I ran across the other day in my web wanderings. Found it on Andrew Exum's blog, Abu Maquwama, which is a well-followed site for insights about counterinsurgency and related topics.

I'm not sure what to think of this. Lot's of different ways to slice it. Is it a new genre? Pak-rock? It is catchy, I'll give it that. In fact, I've got a feeling we might be hearing more from these guys -- if they don't get shwacked by a Pred, that is.

Introducing... the newest (the only?) number by Bumbu Sauce.

On a serious note, for years now I've been loosely aware of a wave of new Islamic music sweeping through the Middle East and the rest of the world. It's being made by young, energetic, often frustrated Muslims who are NOT extremists. In some ways it's like the 50s and 60s in the West.

T.T.

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We can't "offshore" Afghanistan

Tomorrow we’ll remember that horrific day when the towers burned and our countrymen died. As we watched, we knew our world had changed. Within days, we knew America would go to war in a far off place. And we knew it was right to go. Eight years later, too many have forgotten the cruel clarity of that day. Today we hear proposals for “offshoring” the war in Afghanistan. Certain commentators and politicians are looking for an exit, but shrink from openly sounding retreat. Instead, they talk of a "smart" middle course, of fighting terrorists from a distance -- an offshore war by remote control.

This is folly. We cannot hope to prevail in Afghanistan, or even maintain the unsatisfactory status quo, by withdrawing most forces and operating from the periphery. And I say this as a firm believer in the value of U.S. airpower and in exploiting our technological edge. A peripheral strategy is a recipe for failure and defeat.

First, pulling out large numbers of troops would be seen throughout jihadist circles, and the Islamic world generally, as a symbolic defeat of the U.S. Rather than calming things down, withdrawal would embolden Pashtun-led Taliban and extremist al-Qaida elements. Second, reliance on push-button warfare would play directly into the terrorists’ main propaganda themes, that America and the west lack moral courage and only want to subjugate Muslims. They would gain popular support, as the government lost it.

Other realities to keep in mind:

• Geography bites. Yes, we have lethal assets, but they don’t magically appear. We have to factor in the vast distances and severe geography involved in employing drones, aircraft and hunter-killer teams. The nature of the enemy (fleeting, hard to pinpoint), Afghanistan’s incredible terrain, and the time it takes to put steel or men on target means anything based over an hour away is probably too “peripheral”. A consistent campaign requires consistent presence.
  
  
• Intelligence requirements. Targeted raids are hugely dependent on accurate, timely intel. Without it, raids are useless -– or worse. The most valuable intel in this kind of war doesn’t come from satellites, but from human sources who know the right guy, the right village, the right house. And it takes personnel with enough in-country experience to know which source lies out of habit, and which is lying through his teeth. That means we’ll still need people on the ground in uncomfortable places.
  
  
• Support infrastructure. Once the need for a network of forward operating bases is accepted, other things follow. Bases and personnel need to be supplied and protected, and personnel and equipment must be ferried around the country. Soon, we’re back needing ground patrols, convoy escort, checkpoints and fire-bases. Which is pretty much where we are now.

Finally, I'll borrow words from another writer. On Monday, Bret Stephens, columnist for the Wall Street Journal, wrote an insightful piece titled The Afghan Stakes. He made a powerful case for keeping U.S. forces directly engaged in Afghanistan. But his best line was actually a photo caption: “You can’t offshore a handshake”.

T.T.

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Deployed troops need emotional support

Recently, a friend told me her sister was deploying to Afghanistan, and asked how she could best show support. Having deployed myself, and being a parent of a soldier, I shared some perspectives that I think are appropriate for a wider audience. Lots of you have someone close to you heading off to a war zone, or already there.

First, avoid the impulse to send a bunch of stuff you think they might need. If they’re about to deploy, they’re probably already trying to get rid of unnecessary items. And if they’re already over there, they probably have access to most things they need. So, instead of sending another box of baby wipes (supposedly for those without running water), just ask them.

This brings up another point. The individual situations servicemen find themselves in are extremely diverse. Yes, there are some in almost classic “foxhole” situations, living in very austere conditions. But most have three squares a day, have basic creature comforts, and with Internet access can even order consumer items directly.

So your first task is to understand their particular situation. That means educating yourself a little on the unit they’re with, their job, the environment they’re in. Because of operational security, they won’t be able to tell you details, but there is much publicly released information available. Most units have official websites, newsletters and “family readiness groups” that give great information.

The biggest support you can give, however, is emotional. Sending regular letters is probably the biggest single thing you can do to show support. Getting an envelope or package from home can make a deployed troop’s whole week. Emails are good, but nothing beats getting real mail. And, although this takes planning, I suggest frequent mailings, rather than saving things up for a few monster “care packages”.

You can write about almost anything. Just routine news of whatever is going on back home can be immensely important. One of the biggest stressors for deployed troops can be isolation from “the world”. When the challenges of deployment mount, just hearing about the latest family outing, or what’s happening around town, can soften a hard day and give a sense that “normal” still exists. Your personal letters can be a godsend.

But stay positive and upbeat. He or she doesn’t need to hear about every little bump in the road. A constant litany of woe-is-me will not go over well, especially if there’s nothing they can do about it. This can be a balancing act for spouses back home, who certainly struggle with their own challenges. But try to find that balance.

And by far the most encouraging words your soldier, marine, sailor or airman can hear, is how proud you are of them. Whether they’re doing foot patrols, riding in a helicopter, loading up supply trucks, or working in an office, they need to hear your admiration and appreciation. That will be the best support you can possibly give.

T.T.

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More U.S. troops needed in Afghanistan

It took too long for theater commanders, Pentagon generals, and President Bush to realize significantly more American troops would be needed to stabilize and improve the situation in Iraq. Fortunately, the decision was finally made for a surge in 2007, but in hindsight that call should have come as early as 2005.

I was slow on the uptake too, back then. By the time I became convinced we needed more boots on the ground in Iraq it was hardly a cutting-edge observation, and John McCain was screaming it from the rooftops. So, let me get this on the record now. To achieve anything resembling a "win" in Afghanistan will require thousands, no, tens of thousands more U.S. troops to be deployed there, to bring numbers up near 100,000.

Back in February, President Obama committed another 17,000 troops to the fight, which supposedly brought us up to around 65,000 in country (the number varies according to how you count). Those units are now engaged in the tougher provinces. But remember, that decision was taken before he brought in a new overall commander for Afghanistan, General Stan McChrystal.

General McChrystal is now completing his own assessment (how many "strategic reviews" on Afghanistan does that make now?) and is reportedly poised to ask for more forces. That’s been making lots of folks back in Washington uncomfortable. As you may recall, in June Obama’s National Security Advisor, retired General Jim Jones, told U.S. commanders in Afghanistan requests for more troops would be unwelcome. According to journalist Bob Woodward, who accompanied him, Jones lectured commanders not to give the president a “Whiskey Tango Foxtrot moment” by asking for yet another troop increase.

But Jones’ comments, and other indications the Obama administration is starting to waffle on Afghanistan, ought to prompt a lot of “what the…?” moments around the country. Let’s remember, the addition of more troops in February was really just a first-step measure, taken less than a month after Obama took office. Even at the time, JCS Chairman McMullen was saying up to 30,000 more troops would be needed in 2009. In May, the previous commander in Afghanistan was replaced by General McChrystal, which effectively kicked the question of troop levels down the road as the new commander reviewed the situation. Now, several months later, the decision point is here again.

This time, will the Obama administration and a Democratic-led Congress give the on-scene commander what he asks for, or will the request be watered down? Has it already been diluted, by back-channel pressure like that from Jones? According to press reports, McChrystal is set to ask for up to 20,000 more troops. But a senior civilian advisor on the general's own assessment team, Anthony Cordesman, recently stated the U.S. needed to deploy another 9 Brigade Combat Teams, or 45,000 troops, to Afghanistan.

What is happening behind the scenes to the president’s announced view of Afghanistan as the “necessary war”, and to campaign pronouncements that he would “finish the fight” against the Taliban and al-Qaida? Is he already looking for a way out?

T.T.

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Shiism and democracy, part 6

OK, we've established the core beliefs of the Shia, and how their history make them more predisposed than Sunnis to ideas of participatory government -- democracy even. We've discussed the great divide within Shiism, between the recent phenomenon of Khomeinism (clerics rule) and the far older quietism which says religious leaders should advise and counsel, but avoid political power.

What we're seeing play out in Iran today is the clash between those two visions. On one side are “Supreme Leader” Ayatollah Khameini and the hardline mullahs running the theocracy. They back President Ahmadinejad, and rigged the elections that kept him in office. They're also the ones behind the powerful Revolutionary Guards, and the hated basij thugs that beat, shoot and "disappear" protesters. Many analysts say Khameini has essentially enabled a "coup from within" by hardline IRGC and paramilitary forces.

But other Iranian clerics, including much-respected figures like Grand Ayatollahs Montazeri and Sannei, are opposing the hardlinders, siding with forces agitating for the end of theocratic power and a restoration of basic human rights. Right now, Khameini and his mullahs have the upper hand, and the repressive tools to guard it (witness the ongoing show trials in Tehran). But with the crackdown, they've lost the last shreds of legitimacy within the wider Shiite community. Each day almost, we hear of another cleric denouncing Khameini and his puppet regime.

One of these is Ayattolah Mahdi Karroubi, who decries government abuses. In a Washington Post interview, Korroubi said popular opposition is growing "at an extraordinary pace… In the streets, in the bazaars, at weddings and in mosques, everywhere you can hear people complaining about what has happened." Korroubi is in the spotlight right now, because he says he has evidence of rape and torture committed in regime jails.

Each night, rooftop chants of "God is Great", and even "Death to Khameini", continue to echo through Iranian neighborhoods -- despite the dangers. This defiance of the Supreme Leader, and the now open challenges to his religious legitimacy from fellow ayatollahs, represents fundamental change. At its crest is the new wave of clerical support for the popular will, often espousing "one man, one vote", the rule of law and other democratic ideals. It is a change the regime is unlikely to survive.

And it is increasingly clear that those concepts are being transmitted from Iraq – by a living conveyor belt of family members, pilgrims to Najaf, religious students, tribal connections and politicians – into the streets of Tehran, and the seminaries of Qom. The representative system taking shape in Iraq forms a powerful example for Shia all over the world. It is the only country where a Shiite majority can vote in real elections, with real rights, and real results. Iranians see the tree of democracy, watered by the blood of American and Iraqi patriots, growing right next door.

T.T.

See the whole series at Shiism & Democracy

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Shiism and democracy, part 5

A core doctrine of mainline twelver Shiites is belief in the "hidden" Imam, or "Mahdi". According to them, Abu'l Qasim Muhammad ibn Hasan was born in 869 AD, in Iraq, son the 11th Imam. His early life was marked with miracles and when his father died he became the 12th Imam at age 5. Because of persecution he was hidden, first in "minor occultation" (speaking through representatives) then "major occultation", when we was withdrawn altogether from earthly eyes. He will be revealed again in the last days, and (along with Jesus) bring peace and justice to the world.

This apocolyptic doctrine, and centuries of persecution, form the essence of Shiite positions regarding religion (God's law) and politics (man's law). Remember, almost by definition the Shia are the dissenters, the minority, suspicious of governments that so often act unrighteously. Therefore, the traditional stance of Shiite clerics has been to stay above and apart from political power, keeping Islam uncorrupted until the Mahdi is revealed. This is the position called "quietism", though adherents may not be quiet or at all bashful.

Last week I covered Grand Ayatollah Sistani, in Najaf, Iraq, today's foremost proponent of Shiite quietism. But he represents many others following a deep-rooted tradition. In the early 1900s the quietest school was led by Mirza Hussein Na'ini. As Iran’s senior ayatollah, he held that until the Mahdi returned, the best form of government -- allowing the most righteous conditions -- was constitutional democracy. Na'ini said clerics should advise, not rule. A fellow Iranian constitutionalist wrote “sovereignty is founded on justice, fairness and the principle of equality”.

Today, while the Iraqi Shia are very actively practicing representative politics next door, Iranian clerics are watching. Even in Qom, that bastion of religious conservatism outside Tehran, there is a split between clerics who support Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Leader (and successor to Khomeini), and those advocating the quietist position that the theocracy needs to give way to real popular representation. Some are quite open, such as Yusuf Saanei, a vocal supporter of womens rights, who has stated, “the country is [rightly] managed by the will of the people. We cannot say that decision of one individual is right and the beliefs of others are wrong. In an Islamic system everyone has one vote.”

Even more direct are the words of Ayatollah Montazeri, a longtime opponent of the regime. Montazeri (under house arrest in Qom) issued a religious position, a “fatwa” that was widely disseminated after the June elections. In what many see as a declaration that Khameini has lost all legitimacy, he declared, “Injustice is the intentional opposition to the teachings of religion, the foundations of reasonableness, and rationality, and the national accords and consensus that have become the laws of the land. The ruler who opposes these is no longer qualified to rule.”

T.T.

See the whole series at Shiism & Democracy

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